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SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF ELECTION LAW
ADDRESS
MONEY, POLITICS, AND LOBBYING +
Jan WitoldBaran++
This symposium is convened during a historic week. The country and the
world witnessed the peaceful transition of government to the forty-fourth
President of the United States before the largest crowd ever assembled in the
capital city. Beneath the simple and short ceremony of swearing in the
commander in chief lies a lot of preparation and organization. An inauguration
has several producers. The ceremony at the Capitol building is controlled by
Congress, and the expenses of that event are paid by an appropriation of
government funds. Similarly, the parade is organized by the armed forces.
The other inaugural festivities, such as the concerts, balls, parties, receptions,
and parade tickets are the responsibility of the privately organized and
privately funded entity known as the Presidential Inaugural Committee, or PIC.
This year, the PIC raised record amounts of money in ways that reflect the
cross-currents of our symposium topics, which I call money, politics, and
lobbying.
The PIC, like a candidate campaign committee, must file a report with the
Federal Election Commission and disclose the name and address of every
donor of more than $200.' This is a recent legal requirement which resulted2
from the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, (BCRA), often referred to
as McCain-Feingold. In addition, any donor who is a lobbyist or an entity that
employs lobbyists must disclose PIC donations of more than $200 on a
lobbying report as a result of the Honest Leadership and Open Government
+ This text appears substantially as it was delivered on January 23, 2009. Citations are provided
for the reader's convenience, reference, and further research.
Mr. Baran is a senior partner at the Washington, DC law firm of Wiley Rein LLP, where he
heads the Election Law & Government Ethics practice. He has argued several cases before the
United States Supreme Court and represented Senator Mitch McConnell in McConnell v. FEC.
He is the author of The Election Law Primer for Corporations, which is now in its Fifth Edition
and published by the American Bar Association.
1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 308(a)(2), 116 Stat.
81, 103-04 (codified as amended at 36 U:S.C. § 5 10(b) (2006)).
2. Id. (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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3Act of 2007 (HLOGA). However, this year there presumably will not be any
lobbyist donations to report. President Obama imposed a ban on contributions
from corporations, lobbyists, or Political Action Committees (PACs) to his
inaugural committee. 4  No law, including the recent reforms in McCain-
Feingold and HLOGA, prohibits such donations. Rather, the President adopted
a ban on such donations presumably because he believes it is politically
prudent and beneficial.
The dynamics of the inaugural reflect the increasingly complicated dynamics
of political campaigns and the rules that regulate them. There are
constitutional requirements, laws, regulations, issues of private and public
funding, disclosure, contribution limits, self-imposed policies, and huge
amounts of money. The estimated cost of the presidential inaugural was
several hundreds of millions of dollars. While the PIC declined donations
from corporations and lobbyists, it readily sold multimillion dollar broadcast
rights to media entities (who, by the way, employ lobbyists) to help pay for its
parties and events. And like the Obama campaign, it apparently did not suffer
from its self-imposed ban on lobbyist donations because it had thousands, if
not millions, of non-lobbyist donors who gave up to $50,000.
The starting point for both an inaugural and a political campaign is the same.
The Constitution establishes the term of office and the oath that must be taken
by the elected president. Election campaigns operate under safeguards from
the First Amendment. The Constitution sets forth principles that are at the core
of how we campaign and how we are governed. Often, the tensions and
ambiguity of a constitutional doctrine arise when money is involved.
When the Supreme Court, in 1976, held that certain campaign financial
activities are protected by the First Amendment, many disagreed.5 As Justice
Stevens said over twenty years later, "[m]oney is property; it is not speech."6
In a very limited sense, he is correct. Money is a thing, and is not speech,
except perhaps for symbols and phrases that appear on bills such as "In God
we Trust," which is the government's speech, not private speech. The First
Amendment protects our speech, not the government's speech. But Justice
Stevens' point proves too much. If money is property and not speech, then one
can also claim that newsprint is processed wood pulp, not speech, and travel is
movement, not speech, and word-processing machines are devices to launch
encrypted electrons, not speech. What is obvious from all of these examples is
3. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, §
203(a)(d)(l)(D), 121 Stat. 735, 742-43 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1604(d)(1)(F) (Supp.
2008)).
4. Jonathan Weisman & Shailagh Murray, In D.C., Obama Meets with Clinton, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2008, at A4; BarackObama.com, Obama Campaign Airs Two New Television Ads
Across Texas (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.barackobama.com/2008/02/27/obamacampaignairs_
two new te.php (last visited June 28, 2009).
5. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976).
6. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Mat. ...... ; br pa-ers, travel by people whn wnnt to go places to make
speeches, and devices that create words are part of effecting speech.
Moreover, they cost money, which is necessary to implement effective
communication. That is why the Supreme Court in Buckley noted that a law
that allows someone to spend no more than $1000 to communicate about a
candidate is like a law that allows citizens to travel by car as much as they
want on one tank of gasoline.7 Both a spending limit on communications and a
restriction on travel impair protected activity.
The Court recognized that money is not speech but is indispensable to
speaking. The Buckley decision has withstood the tests of challenges and
reforms. It recognized the validity of limits on contributions to campaigns in
order to prevent potentially corrupt arrangements. At the same time, it struck
down limits on how much a campaign could spend, and it struck down
attempts to limit the amount of public communications that speakers could
finance without collaborating with a campaign.8 The McCain-Feingold law
sought to expand the universe of regulation in several ways. It banned
contributions from minors. 9  It banned and/or regulated independent
advertising that mentioned the name of a candidate in pre-election periods.', It
also created a mechanism whereby candidates who were opposed by so-called
"millionaires" would be eligible to raise larger amounts of money from
contributors.1 ' It also federalized fundraising by political parties by
prohibiting the solicitation, collection, or use of "soft money," which
predominantly were funds from corporations and unions.
12
McCain-Feingold was enacted after several decisions by the Supreme Court
which appeared to lessen the scrutiny of campaign finance laws. 13 Several
Justices, particularly Justice Breyer, urged the court to give legislators great
deference because they presumably were directly familiar with the campaign
process and the steps needed to preserve its integrity. This was an odd
suggestion in light of the history of campaign finance legislation. For
example, public financing was passed and signed into law by President Nixon
only after the Democratic Congress agreed that the law would not be effective
until after Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign. 14  Not coincidentally, the
7. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18.
8. Id. at 19-20, 54-58.
9. 2 U.S.C. § 441k (2006).
10. Id. § 434(0(I)-(3).
11. Id. § 441a-I(a)(1).
12. Id. § 441i(a)(1)-(2).
13. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402-04 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
14. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 801-02, 85 Stat. 497, 562-74; see also
ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 50 (1997); Thomas
Cmar, Toward a Small Donor Democracy. The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small
Political Contributions, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 443, 454 (2005); Melvin 1. Urofsky, Campaign
Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 1, 49 (2008).
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Democratic party supported public funding because it would provide money to
their presidential campaigns while limiting the spending of their historically
better-financed Republican opponents.
McCain-Feingold contained its own honey pot for incumbents. The bill
increased the amounts candidates could raise for their own campaigns,
15
punished millionaire opponents,' 6 removed funding of political parties who
traditionally criticize candidates of the other party, 17 and criminalized pre-
election advertising that tended to criticize incumbents.' 8 What a deal if you
are a legislator who has to run for re-election! More money for me and less
money for my critics. Do these motives deserve deference from the Supreme
Court?
McConnell v. FEC upheld the major provisions of McCain-Feingold from
facial challenges, although the ban on contributions from minors was struck
down. 19 The narrow decision of the Court seemed to be a retreat from Buckley.
However, subsequent decisions have steadily pared away the McConnell
conclusions. The Supreme Court declared the "Millionaire's Amendment"
20unconstitutional. In another case involving a Vermont law that sought to
limit campaign expenditures, the Court reaffirmed Buckley's holding that such
limits violate the First Amendment. 21 And in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
the Court limited the scope of the ban on pre-election advertising by allowing
commentary about candidates and incumbents if it does not encourage viewers
and listeners to vote for or against the individual.22 There is a case pending
this term that will address whether suchpermitted advertising can be subject to
mandatory reports with the government.
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly confronted cases involving
campaign finance, it rarely sees cases about lobbying and lobbyists. This will
likely change. I am not a lobbyist, but I know lobbyists. They seem like nice,
decent people. Federal and state laws increasingly place obligations and
burdens on lobbyists. These obligations include filing reports with the
government and complying with restrictions on gifts and political
contributions-restrictions which are greater than those imposed on any other
citizens. In the aftermath of several scandals involving lobbyists and the
Obama and McCain presidential campaigns that castigated lobbyists, the mere
word "lobbyist" is being equated in the public mind with "crook" and "serial
15. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2006).
16. Id. § 441a-I(a).
17. Id. § 441b.
18. Id. § 441b(b)(2).
19. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231-33 (2003).
20. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2766, 2775 (2008).
21. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006).
22. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007).
23. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277, 280-81 (D.D.C. 2008), prob. juris.
noted, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008).
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killer." Rarely does a public commentator note that lobbying is one of the five
freedoms enshrined in the First Amendment: speech, assembly, press, petition
for the redress of grievances, and establishment of religion. I have pondered
how Congress could regulate all five freedoms at once. Imagine, how would
Congress regulate a group of reporters for church-owned publications who
form an association to lobby on behalf of school vouchers? There are laws that
prohibit lobbyists from donating to campaigns even when there are
24contribution limits that supposedly prevent corruption. There also are so-
called "pay-to-play" laws which deny government contracts to firms or
individuals who make contributions to certain campaigns.25 We don't know
yet the extent to which the Constitution permits restrictions and burdens on
individuals or organizations because they have elected to exercise a right to
petition government. Some would call this punishment. Others call it good
government. Under what standard will the Supreme Court review these
restrictions? Will it be under so-called strict scrutiny or a lesser standard?
Will the Court defer to the legislature because of their familiarity with
lobbyists, or will such deference be inappropriate because legislators prefer to
legislate without being bothered by pesky lobbyists?
Finally, no matter what is or is not constitutional, will the regulation of
26politics and lobbying be good public policy? The prohibition of alcohol was
constitutional, but it made no sense. It was bad policy. State campaign finance
laws are interesting, because each state regulates differently. The state of
Missouri imposed severe contribution limits that were held constitutional by
27the Supreme Court. Yet, within a decade, the state revised its laws, and now
many donations are not subject to limits.28  Missouri imposed low limits,
fought to have them declared constitutional, and then said, "never mind."
Missouri concluded that low but constitutional limits were not good policy, at
least for now.
Corporate donations are illegal under federal law.29 However, twenty-eight
states permit corporate donations in various degree. Florida has a $500 limit
on all contributions to candidates, including coporate contributions.30
Virginia has no prohibitions or limits on contributions. Virginia government
24. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2004); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85702
(West 2005).
25. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441c(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-612(g)(2)(A) (West Supp.
2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-12(d) (West 2006).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
27. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382, 395-98 (2000).
28. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032 (West 2003), repealed by S.B. 1038, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. § A (Mo. 2008).
29. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006).
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08(1)(a) (West 2008).
31. Rhodes Beahm Ritenour, Federal Campaign Finance Reform Based on Virginia
Election Law: The Carson Act as a Simple, Effective, and Constitutional Means to Curb
20091
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is widely recognized as effective and honest. Illinois also has no contribution
limits,32 yet it has a reputation for corrupt government. Why is there a
difference? Is it the culture? Is it the different types of voters? Or is it the fact
that Virginia has a law that prohibits successive terms of office for its
governor, which removes the need for a governor to raise money for a re-
election campaign? Whatever the reasons, the presence or absence of
extensive campaign finance regulation, even that which is constitutional, does
not seem to predictably correlate with more honest or more effective
government.
The debate thus goes on. How should the political process be regulated?
How much can it be regulated? What is constitutional, and what is good
policy? Absent laws, what steps will candidates and officials take for the sake
of appearances and policies? During his campaign, President Obama rejected
donations from lobbyists or PACs. He raised a record sum of money-$750
million. His Inaugural Committee did the same and also raised record
amounts. As President Obama took office this week, his first executive order
targeted gifts to administration officials from lobbyists and restricted both the
hiring of former lobbyists, as well as lobbying by officials after they depart
government for the duration of his term or terms. It will be interesting to see
whether these policies will be turned into law. It also will be interesting to see
how these measures, whether legally imposed or voluntarily implemented, will
work in a re-election campaign, or whether former administration officials in
the sixth or seventh year of an Obama administration complain that the ban on
lobbying impermissibly infringes on their constitutional rights.
Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair once stated that the role of money
in politics is "one of the great unresolved questions of our democracy. ' '33 This
timely symposium may not resolve the question, but it will contribute to
further thoughtful discussion.
Corruption in the Financing of Federal Campaigns, 42 U. RicH. L. REv. 123, 154, 158-60
(2007).
32. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law,
Statement at the Elections and Campaign Reform Committee Hearing Before the Illinois General
Assembly (March 27, 2007), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/648de8979eb8fcfl 19tqm6b
nnes.pdf.
33. Marco R. della Cava, Blair Makes Quick Work of Finance Scandal, USA TODAY, Nov.
19, 1997, at 8A.
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